André J. Crawford Ph.D. Candidate Department of Economics Virginia Tech Contact Information: Department of Economics Virginia Tech 3016 Pamplin Hall (0316) Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316 540.231.4069 (office) 917.747.0768 (mobile) 540.231.5097 (fax) Email: andrec<at>vt.edu
Curriculum Vitae Fields: Industrial Organization, Applied Econometrics, Computational Methods Dissertation Title: “Product Differentiation, Collusion, and Empirical Analyses of Market Power.” (Abstract) Dissertation Committee: Hans Haller (Chair) Richard Ashley Nancy Lutz, Chetan Dave Everett Peterson Christopher Parmeter Research: CURRENT PAPERS “Anti-competitiveness in the European Car Market,” (Job Market Paper) Abstract: Since 1985 the European Union has given automobile manufacturers throughout Europe the latitude to negotiate selective and exclusive vertical agreements with their dealers. This Block Exemption system allows manufacturers to freely select their own dealers and establish certain criteria such as training of staff and performance and sales targets. Manufacturers are also allowed to assign exclusive territories to their dealers where no one else is permitted to sell. Naturally, the exemption system has opened the door to a wave of anti-competitive practices. Indeed, it has paved the way for manufacturers to establish virtual monopolies in many countries across Europe, prompting observers to refer to the car market as one of the most protected havens of European industry Against this background, this paper proposes and estimates a multiproduct oligopoly model in conjunction with a model of discrete choice to determine whether or not there exists patterns of anti-competitiveness across the European car market. In particular, the paper empirically challenges the view that the car market throughout Europe is wholly anti-competitive. The estimation results lend support to the hypothesis that conduct varies by marketing segments depending on the intensity of within-segment competition from rival firms. Specifically, there is evidence of competitive pricing behavior in the compact and intermediate marketing segments, cooperative behavior in the subcompact and standard segments, and Bertrand pricing in the luxury car segments. “Sustaining Collusion under multi-regime product differentiation” “On Ricardian Equivalence in a Model with Dual-Purpose Government Spending,” (with Chetan Dave) WORK IN PROGRESS “Market Conduct in the U.S. Auto Industry: Evidence from Transaction Price Data,” (with Prasun Bhattacharjee) Links: Virginia Tech Department of Economics Seminar Series Virginia Tech Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics Seminar Series University of The West Indies (Mona) Department of Economics
Last Updated: November, 2007