My research centers on the history and philosophy of science, especially on scientific experiment and theory building. Recent work focuses on the relationship between the model-theoretic tradition in the 19th century and experimental science during that period. I am also working on several projects on Kantian philosophy as a response to empiricism and rationalism. In Fall 2009, I am a Visiting Fellow at the Pitt Center for Philosophy of Science.
Talks 2009-2010
- “Two challenges for the unification of electromagnetism and optics”
Pitt Center for the Philosophy of Science, 6 October 2009
- “Who's qualified to teach philosophy?”
Slippery Rock University, 27 October 2009
- “Why Kant needs the principles”
American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, 30 December 2009
Pitt Center for the Philosophy of Science, 6 October 2009
- “Who's qualified to teach philosophy?”
Slippery Rock University, 27 October 2009 - “Why Kant needs the principles”
American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, 30 December 2009
Articles
Kant's account of space as an infinite given magnitude in the first Critique is paradoxical: infinite magnitudes go beyond the limits of possible experience. Michael Friedman's and Charles Parsons's accounts make sense of geometrical construction, but I argue that they do not resolve the paradox. I argue that metaphysical space is based on the ability of the subject to generate distinctly oriented spatial magnitudes of invariant scalar quantity through translation or rotation. The set of determinately oriented, constructed geometrical spaces is a proper subset of metaphysical space, thus, metaphysical space is infinite in Kant's terms.
The Marburg neo-Kantians argue that Hermann von Helmholtz's empiricist account of the a priori does not account for certain knowledge, since it is based on a psychological phenomenon, trust in the regularities of nature. They argue that Helmholtz's account raises the “problem of validity” (Gültigkeitsproblem): how to establish a warranted claim that observed regularities are based on valid logical or mathematical relations. I reconstruct Heinrich Hertz's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's Bild-theoretic answer to the problem of validity: that scientists and philosophers can depict the necessary a priori constraints on states of affairs in a given system, and can establish whether these relations are actual relations in nature. Carnap revises the argument for validity by attempting to give semantic rules for translation between frameworks. Russell and Quine object that pragmatics better accounts for the role of a priori reasoning in translation. The conclusion of the tale, then, is a partial vindication of Helmholtz's original account.
German supporters of the Kantian philosophy in the late 19th century took one of two forks in the road: the fork leading to Baden, and the Southwest School of neo-Kantian philosophy, and the fork leading to Marburg, and the Marburg School, founded by Hermann Cohen. Cohen's contributions to the debates on Kant's theory of space and time in the late 19th century shed light on this turn “back to Kant” in German philosophy.
Translations, reviews, discussion
Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) participated in two of the most significant developments in physics and in the philosophy of science in the 19th century: the proof that Euclidean geometry does not describe the only possible visualizable and physical space, and the shift from physics based on actions between particles at a distance to the field theory. Helmholtz formulated the principle of energy conservation, the vortex equations for fluid dynamics, and the notion of free energy in thermodynamics, and invented the ophthalmoscope. His constant interest in the epistemology of science guarantees his enduring significance for philosophy.
“For Cohen, Kant's system answers the truly fateful question of philosophy in general: the question of the relation between philosophy and science. The reconstruction of this system from its original driving forces takes us into the midst of the historical debate over the continuation of philosophy itself.”