Section One, Question One

Since equality is an unknown state in our lives we must use theoretical models of societies in order to try and figure out what equality is, how to figure out which society is more equal, and how we are to judge equality as a standard. Let us suppose we have two societies with two different distributions of goods respectively. In society 1 we have distribution 1 and in society 2 we have distribution 2. Distribution 1 allocates 100 units of goodness (G) to 10 people and 50 G to 90 people. While distribution 2 allocates 100 G to 75 people and 60 G to 25 people. How do we decide which of these distributions is better with respect to equality?

Distribution 1 can be claimed to be more equal than 2 since the number of people with a greater quantity of goodness is relatively few compared to those without as much goodness. You have 90% of the society being equal with respect to the amount of goodness they posses and a few, 10% of the society, having a greater quantity of G. Obviously more of society 1 is equal to each other than society 2 so therefore the distribution of society 1 seems to be better with respect to equality of distribution of G. Temkin would agree with this with his Relative to the Average View (RAV), which states “all those worse off than average can complain; the seriousness of a complaint is determined by comparison to the average.” Now 90 people can complain about inequality in society 1 using the RAV model of equality, and only 25 people in society 2 can complain. Yet the reason society 1 is judged as better with respect to equality is because the average amount of goodness is 55, so the 90 people receiving 50 G can complain but the seriousness of the complaint is not as high as compared to that of society 2, where the 25 people are 30 G below the average (90 G).

Yet the inverse of this claim can be made for distribution 2. Since the majority of citizens of society 2, 75%, have 100 G and only 25% of less it would seem plausible to say society 2’s distribution is more equal. This is true since more members of society 2 are receiving 100 G, and the 25 lower citizens are still receiving 60 G, 10 G above that of society 1. The objection to this is that you still have 25% of the society below the average goodness level. Yet this is easily refuted by the fact that the 25 people in society 2 have 60 G each, which is still a higher amount of units then the 90 people in society 1 who have 50 G. So the minimum amount of G present in society 2 is higher than that of 1, which shows a higher standard of goodness present in society 2. Thus since everyone in these societies is equally deserving of this goodness it seems that society 2 would be better with respect to equality since the lowest amount of goodness its citizens posses, 60 G, is still a greater quantity than that of society 1’s, 50 G. Oppenheim agrees with this assessment in his “Equal Shares to a Relatively Large Group” (ESRLG). This states, “A rule of distribution X is more egalitarian than rule Y if and only if X distributes benefits to more people than Y.” Obviously society 2 is distributing 100 units of G to 75 people, while society 1 only distributes 100 G to 10 people. Temkin’s Relative to the Best-Off View (RBOV) furthermore asserts the same conclusion. Since everyone but the best off can complain 25 people in society 2 can complain, and so can the 90 people in society 1. What makes society 2 more equal is the fact the complaint from them is less serious than that of society 1’s, since the difference in amount of goodness between the two groups in society 2 is only 30 G, while it is 50 G in society 1.

However, if we were to use The Relative to All Those Better Off View (RATBOV) we would conclude society 1 is by far more equal. RATBOV is similar to RBOV, yet it states “the more people are better off, the bigger the complaint.” Thus with 75 people better off in society 2 their complaint is more serious than that of society 1, who only has 10 better of citizens.

But with the claim that all citizens in our theoretical societies are equally deserving of this goodness one can claim society 1 is easily seen as better with respect to equality than society 2. This can be shown very simply: every citizen is equally deserving; no citizen should have less or more goodness then the majority, yet if there is no way around this you want to keep the number to a minimum; thus since the majority of society 1 is receiving the lower amount of goodness and very few citizens have more than the majorities share of goodness it is more equal than society 2. Since any “extra” goodness is delegated purely on arbitrary means since everyone is equally deserving it is safe to say the number of citizens with more than the average amount of G for the society should be relatively small compared to the other group.

I think we have reached a point where we need to decide how we are to judge a society with respect to equality: is it based on the portion of society receiving the least amount of goodness or the portion of society that is receiving the most amount of goodness? I believe it should be based upon the portion of society receiving the most amount of goodness, but there is also a corollary to this: the difference in amounts of goodness being received should be kept as small as possible. This view is much like that of Temkin’s RATBOV, yet the difference is that the majority of the citizen’s of a society should be receiving the highest amount of G possible, and the group receiving any lower quantity of G should be kept as small as possible.

Now with this new view it is easy to see society 2 is far better than society 1 with respect to equality. This is so because the majority of society 2 is receiving the higher amount of goodness and the amount of difference between the two groups is still less than society 1’s difference. To show it mathematically:

SOCIETY 1	100 G	50 G
Number of people	10	90
SOCIETY 2	100 G	60 G
Number of people	75	25

While the amount of 100 G is greater in society 2 people would argue the majority should be the group possessing the least amount of goodness. Yet this is refuted by my criterion for a society with respect to equality. So we can claim society 2 possess a greater amount of people with a greater amount of goodness then does society 1, and furthermore, society 2’s lowest amount of goodness, 60 G, is still higher then the lowest amount of goodness in society 1, 50 G.

Section 2, Question 3

For Hobbes equality is: “Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind… the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.” It is prudent however, to point out that Hobbes is not affirming everyone is equal in every respect. Yet, he is claiming when you look at men in totality all there strengths and weaknesses equal out, for the most part, thus making men equal.

Along with Hobbes’ view of equality he proposes three “Laws of Nature”: the Fundamental Law of Nature; the Second Law of Nature; and the Third Law of Nature. “Every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war” is Hobbes’ Fundamental Law of Nature. He asserts, “That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself” as the Second Law of Nature. While the Third Law of Nature states, “But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust; and the definition of INJUSTICE is no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust is just.”

In the Third Law of Nature, Hobbes speaks of a covenant and it will do good to define what he means by such a term. But, before we can define what a covenant is we must first explain what a contract is in Hobbes’ view. A contract is nothing more than a mutual transferring of rights. A covenant is a concept built off of contracts where one or both parties involved to the contract are trusted to fulfill their end of the contract at a later time. The difference between a covenant and a contract is in a contract the rights are transferred at the same time, thus it is impossible to break, while a party involved in a covenant can break it if he so chooses to do so.

This now brings us to exactly what Hobbes views of justice are. Once again he puts forth three separate Theories of Justice (HTJ). HTJ 1 is as follows, “Act ‘a’ is just if and only if in performing ‘a’, the agent of ‘a’ does not break any valid covenants.” “Society ‘S’ is perfectly just if and only if no valid covenants made in ‘S’ are broken” is HTJ 2. Finally, HTJ 3 states “In the state of nature, ever act is just.” HTJ 1 brings up a concept of valid covenants, Hobbes believed covenants can be both valid and invalid depending upon the circumstances. He claimed a covenant is valid if and only if there is a common power set over both parties involved, such as a government. In other words, A covenant “C” is valid at time ‘t’ if and only if (1) the acts obliged under “C” have not been performed or forgiven before ‘t’; (2) no party to “C” can be reasonably suspicious that another part will break the covenant; (3) fulfilling the acts required by “C” does not require breaking a previously made covenant; (4) “C” does not require anyone not to defend themselves.

Hobbes asserts that because all men are equal in totality, this breeds fear since every other man has the same ability to reach the same end, yet only one of them may actually possess it. From this fear comes war since everyone has the equal chance of obtaining a certain goal people feel the only way for them to get it is to resort to war where force and cunning will allow them to possibly be better then others. Due to this Hobbes asserts in his Fundamental Law of Nature that men should “endeavor peace” or in other words “to seek peace, and follow it.” It is this law of nature which gives rise to government in order to enforce covenants. Since any covenant made outside of any governmental control to enforce that one party live up to their end of the bargain they become null. This is obvious by the fact that equality in the end breeds war, thus in a state with no power over two people in a covenant the person receiving the others requirement of the covenant first would have no reason to live up to his requirement. And, obviously getting something without fulfilling your requirement of the covenant would give you an advantage, and since force and cunning are the two modes of operation in a warring society according to Hobbes it will always turn out this way.

Hobbes’ third theory of justice may seem wrong to many at first glance, yet after further inspection one can find it holds true. This is so since Hobbes defines unjust as the breaking of a covenant, and anything that is not unjust is just. Thus the only injustice that can happen in the world is if someone broke a covenant. But this is not possible since we have governments instilled with the power over people to enforce such covenants. And, the reason we have governments is precisely because of Hobbes’ Second Law of Nature. It is out of practicality that we entrust a government with such power over all of us to make sure we are protected from such individuals who wish to break the peace. In other words, society would decay if there were no government to protect the peace and covenants people enter into. Yet “state of nature” is when there is no civil authority present with power over both parties involved in a covenant. So as previously shown, every act once again is just. This is so because according to Hobbes there can be no covenants unless there is a civil authority with the power over both parties involved in a covenant present. Thus there isn’t any injustice in a world with no civil authorities present.