John M. Jackson

jojacks2[at]vt.edu

The Red-Hair People of Deshima:

Dutch Traders and Their Impact on Japan

copyright © John M. Jackson, 2004

Though the opening of Japan is usually dated from the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853, the Japanese had actually maintained continuous contact with the West since the mid-sixteenth century. The events surrounding Perry's arrival were no doubt followed closely by a tiny enclave of Dutch traders living on the small isle of Deshima in Nagasaki's harbor. "This minute outpost," writes Goodman, "remained for over two centuries Japan's window on the Western world" (17). Though contact had been limited during that time, the Dutch presence on Deshima nevertheless played a vital role in introducing the Japanese to the West. In this paper, I hope to examine the early history of Dutch-Japanese interaction and show that Japan's extended contact with the Dutch had an important impact on Japanese history, despite the severe restrictions placed on rangaku ("Dutch studies").

Holland was not the first European power to arrive in Japan; the Portuguese preceded the Dutch by 50 years, landing in 1543. Though the Portuguese maintained a monopoly on the Japanese trade for a number of decades, their influence on Japan was negligible. The Portuguese did have some modest success in converting the Japanese to Christianity, and the century between 1540 and 1640 is often referred to as Japan's "Christian Century." Though Massarella (35) claims that Christianity made only minor inroads in Japan, the missionaries seemed optimistic for the prospects for the expansion of Catholicism. It is little wonder, then, that they were concerned by the arrival of a ship from Protestant Holland. "They were instinctively jealous of their position in Japan," Massarella (72) observes.

The Liefde, piloted by Will Adams (an Englishman employed by the Dutch0, anchored off Bungo, Kyushu, in mid-April 1600 (Massarella 73). The Portuguese wasted no time in conspiring against the new arrivals, portraying them to the new Tokugawa bakafu as pirates and rebels (Massarella 75). The Japanese had suspicions of their own regarding the newcomers, for the Liefde, heavily laden with military weapons, bore little semblance to a trade mission (Massarella 76). Through interrogation of Adams, however, the Japanese were satisfied of the crew's intent. The bakafu also learned that Europe was split by ideological and theological differences; it was a discovery that marked the end of the Catholic missionaries' monopoly as representatives of Western civilization.

During the news few years, Holland, Spain and England slowly developed trade with Japan. In 1609, the first ships of the Dutch East Indies Company arrived at Hirado. The Dutch were granted the right to free trade in Japan, and a factory was established at Hirado. The Dutch were granted the right to free trade in Japan, and a factory was established at Hirado in 1612 (Massarella 83-4). Despite a promising start, the newcomers gave Portugal little competition. By 1623, England had abandoned the Japanese trade as unprofitable (Goodman 12). The Dutch, perhaps more optimistic, considered abandoning their factory in 1617, but persevered at Hirado, while the Portuguese remained ensconced at the more prosperous port of Nagasaki. Eventually, the Dutch would replace the Portuguese as supreme traders in Japan, but, as Massarella (85) observes, "when they did, it was for reasons largely beyond their control."

By 1612, the bakafu had grown increasingly alarmed by the introduction of Christianity into Japan. Through the Tokugawa government did not fear Christian theology per se, it believed that conversion of the masses would lead to divided loyalties and spur a revolution or native-assisted European invasion (Keene 1). The bakafu ordered a ban on Christian propagation in 1612 and the expulsion of missionaries in 1614 (Massarella 11).

By 1625, Christian missionary work was virtually eradicated in Japan. The Spanish had been expelled in 1622 for being especially recalcitrant in following the ban on Christianity. With the voluntary departure of the English the following year, only the Dutch and Portuguese remained in Japan. The activities of both groups were restricted to their respective factories in Hirado and Nagasaki, and their activities closely monitored (Goodman 11). Though the bakafu felt that the Portuguese had not complied fully with the new regulations, the Iberians were tolerated for their connections to Chinese silk markets. The bakafu had no intention of supplanting the Portuguese with the unproven Dutch at that time, however.

A small Christian presence remained in Japan despite the bakafu's oppressive measures, and the Tokugawa, ever concerned with protecting their position, considered the foreign religion a threat and enforced more severe restrictions. A 1630 edict banned all books mentioning Christianity (the edict dealt primarily with Chinese translations of European texts, as no Japanese could read the original European texts (Sansom 199-200). The Shimabura uprising of 1638, in which a few Japanese Christians participated, seemed to confirm the Tokugawa's fears, the uprising was blamed upon the Portuguese, who were soon banished from Japan (Goodman 14). The Dutch, meanwhile, had won favor with the bakafu by firing upon the rebels at Hera Castle. Though their action had little effect on the battle's outcome, according to Goodman (15), "this breech of 'Christian' conduct on the part of the Hollanders was to be the subject of widespread condemnation by their fellow Europeans for centuries' (15). The bakafu decree of 1638 not only banished the Portuguese, but it also forbade foreign travel by Japanese and treated those who were already outside the country as exiles. With the issuance of this edict, the Dutch became Japan's sole direct contact with the West. (Chinese traders were permitted to remain in Japan.)

The fortunes of the bustling port of Nagasaki had declined rapidly after the expulsion of the Portuguese; the town elders successfully petitioned the bakafu to have the Dutch trade transferred there as recompense (Boxer 155). In May 1641, the Dutch merchants of Hirado were ordered to remove themselves to the isle of Deshima, where they would continue trading (Massarella 345). The Dutch welcomed their promotion to a prosperous port, writes Keene (2). "They may even have felt as they took over the buildings erected originally for the Portuguese that the act was symbolic of the passing of supremacy in the Orient from Portugal to Holland." Though the Dutch would indeed be masters of the Japanese trade, they would find their activities strictly controlled by a cautious bakafu.

If the Hollanders had any illusions about their status in Japan, they were no doubt dispelled by their new home. Artificially constructed, Deshima lay in a fan shape that comprised approximately 16,000 square yards. The isle's surface rose a mere three feet above the high water mark of Nagasaki's harbor, and its entire area was encircled by a high wooden fence, topped with iron spikes and serviced by two gates (Goodman 11, 19). The seaward gate was to be opened only once annually, when the Dutch merchant fleet arrived from Batavia. The other gate led to a stone bridge that connected the factory with the mainland. The bridge was well-guarded; only bakafu officials, Japanese interpreters, and select "public women" were granted access (Goodman 21). The factory's personnel rarely exceeded 20 men, and despite the allowance for female companionship, life on Deshima was no doubt somewhat lonely and monotonous during the long periods between trading seasons. As Keene (3) writes, "They were prisoners, free only to walk up and down the two streets of their tiny isle, watched, guarded, and spied upon."

The Dutch trade vessels usually arrived at Nagasaki in mid-summer and were greeted by the Deshima directory--the opperhoofd-- as well as a few interpreters and bakafu officials. Upon anchoring, the ships and crews were scoured by the Japanese for Bibles and religious paraphernalia. The sails, arms, and ammunition of each ship were then surrendered to the Japanese until the Dutch vessels were prepared to depart. Under Tokugawa regulations, the fleets were required to depart by September 20, regardless of weather conditions (Boxer 158).

Before the commencement of the trading seasons, the Nagasaki officials and interpreters chose imported items for the Dutch to present as gifts to the bakafu officials at Edo. 'the chosen gifts," writes Boxer (160), "varied greatly according to the fleeting fancies of the recipients." In the mid-seventeenth century, items such as colored glasses, rhinoceros horn, and hunting paraphernalia made popular gifts.

The opperhoofd and select personnel were permitted to travel to Edo annually on what could be called a "tribute mission." (As Dutch profits fell in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the missions were conducted biennially, and later, quadrennially.) At Edo, they presented their gifts to bakafu officials as tokens of respect and as insurance for continued goodwill. The opperhoofd presented himself at Edo by crawling to the shogun's veiled dais and touched his head once to the floor (Goodman 29). After this brief ceremony the Dutch--or the "red-hair people," as they were known to the Japanese--were guests at a reception at which they were required to answer a multitude of questions from fascinated scholars. The merchants were also asked to perform miniature scenes of European behavior and social interaction for the enlightenment (and perhaps amusement) of the officials (Goodman 28).

According to Keene (5), the Dutch were disparaged by other Europeans for their submission to the humilities heaped upon them by the Japanese, and one might wonder why the Dutch were so willing to remain virtual prisoners on Deshima and debase themselves at Edo. Early in their history, the Dutch had recognized in themselves an aptitude for commerce. By the sixteenth century, their merchant fleet had become one of the strongest and most efficient in the world. The Dutch also recognized that successful trade often depended upon diplomatic ability. If trade with Japan depended upon submission to Japanese idiosyncrasies, the Dutch were willing to sacrifice pride for profit (Goodman 13).

The Japanese trade was certainly profitable for the Dutch. Profits on silk imported to Japan ranged from 20 to 200 percent during the late seventeenth century. European products, such as mirrors, pictures, and books, also brought large profits as novelty items, and other imports such as sugar, spices and tin also sold well in Japan. The Dutch were making even larger profits on raw materials exported from Japan. In the mid-seventeenth century, Dutch profits on precious metal exports were running between 50 and 80 percent. Combined exports and imports of a single trade mission often netted the Dutch a profit of more than 100 percent (Boxer 164). As Boxer (160) concludes, "It was for the sake of the enormous quantities of gold, silver and copper which they... procured from here, that they endured all the insults and indignities which they had perforce to suffer in Japan."

Japanese merchants were benefiting from foreign trade as well. Seventeenth century Nagasaki records show a profit of 45 percent on the Dutch trade, though incidents of smuggling probably hid the true profit margin (Boxer 165). The benefits enjoyed by a few Nagasaki merchants were not a compelling reason for the Tokugawa to maintain contact with Holland, however. Instead, it was both fear and fascination that allowed the Dutch to maintain contact with Holland, however. Instead, it was both fear and fascination that allowed the Dutch to remain on Deshima; the Dutch traders provided the Tokugawa with closely guarded access to the Western world (Jansen 541). Had the Tokugawa not been so concerned with maintaining their position, rangaku may have had a greater influence on Japan. Ironically, it was these same concerns that would foster some avenues of rangaku.

While the Tokugawa were concerned by Western influence, they also recognized that Dutch technology might provide tools to maintain the status quo. Recognizing that the insurance of good crops was a primary responsibility of a successful ruler, Tokugawa Yoshimune encouraged scholars to study Western geography and astronomy to create more accurate calendars (Goodman 46). To facilitate such inquiry, Yoshimune ease restrictions on the importation of foreign books in 1720 (Keene 13). Yoshimune also imported many plant and animal specimens (Goodman 59-60). Though he gathered information on a variety of subjects from the Dutch, most of his interests arose from simple pragmatism (Goodman 63). Improvements in the measurement of time proved that there were practical benefits to be derived from contact with the West.

The interests of the rangakashu ("Dutch scholars") were somewhat more far-ranging than those of the shogun, but were slow to develop under Tokugawa restrictions. With the early banning of books mentioning Christianity, writes Keene (13), the were isolated from Western secular theories as well. Until the mid-eighteenth century, the primary instrument for the dissemination of Western knowledge was a corps of official interpreters, the accomplishments of which are often viewed as negligible. Beneficiaries of a hereditary system, few of the interpreters were serious scholars. Furthermore, they had no skilled teachers, and a Japanese-Dutch dictionary was not completed until 1796 (Keene 12; Jansen 544). Some of the interpreters did learn medicine by observing Dutch physicians, and it was through their practice of Dutch medicine and language that they laid a foundation for true ragakashu (Goodman 42).

Apart from the hindrance of government restrictions and inadequate interpreters, the Dutch on Deshima also offered little encouragement for the study of the West. As Keene (7) notes, " Not more than a half dozen of those who visited Japan during the two hundred and fifty years of the factory's existence could be described as cultured men." Duty in the Far East did not attract the best personnel. "Surgeons" were more often barber's apprentices and the opperhoofd usually gained their position through nepotism (Keene 6). Nevertheless, as Goodman (231) notes, it is unfair to judge merchants as cultural emissaries. Despite their commercial mission and cultural ignorance, the residents of Deshima could teach the Japanese many new things.

The development of rangaku began to surge in the 1720s, when Tokugawa Yoshimune ordered the respected scholars Noro Genjo and Aoki Konyoto to study Dutch science and language, respectively. The order legitimized rangaku, and the movement gained a greater voice during the latter eighteenth century (Keene 14-15). The first book on Dutch studies, Rangaku Kotohajime, was published in 1774, describing the acquisition and translation of Dutch works and the performance of a dissection that revealed the accuracy of Dutch anatomical texts (Sansom 204).

Besides their practical interests in Western medicine, the rangakashu displayed interest in many other aspects of Western civilization. Western art, for example, had developed much different conventions than that of the Orient. "The techniques of perspective and shading... were in themselves profound discoveries to the Japanese," writes Keene (11). While some artists heralded the techniques as superior art, other continued to hold the traditional Japanese opinion that superior art depicted the essence of things, and that realistic images were the work of craftsmen, not artists (Sansom 233).

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Japan's Confucian scholars were becoming alarmed by the spread of rangaku. Conservative by nature, the Confucianists of the bakafu also had a vested interest in preserving a system through which they had gained power (Goodman 198). The Confucianists of the bakafu also had a vested interest in preserving a system through which they had gained power (Goodman 198). The Confucianists claimed that praise of Western civilization inherently implied denigration of native Japanese culture, and they called for greater restrictions on the rangakashu.

Ironically, rangaku may have actually encouraged an interest in kokugaku ("native studies") and Shinto revivalism, both of which have been credited with the great changes in late nineteenth century Japan. Through rangaku, the Japanese learned of a strong culture which had developed independently Chinese civilization (Keene 27). Seeing such an example, some scholars undoubtedly turned to ancient Japanese civilization for signs of greatness and discovered the series of events that had led to the shogun's supremacy. Shintoists such as Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843) studied Western theology as a way to disprove the tenets of Confucianism and Buddhism, which Hirata believed had corrupted the Japanese. The Copernican theory of heliocentricity confirmed for the Shintoists the importance of the Shinto Sun Goddess, and many embraced Western advances in medicine (Keene 159-60). The Shintoists remained strongly ethnocentric, however, and their studies did nothing to lessen their belief that Japan was inherently superior to the West (Keene 163).

Like the Shintoists, most of the rangakashu continued to believe that the Japanese were a superior race. Thought they were willing to concede Dutch advances in science and technology, the Japanese still considered the Westerners to be barbarians. The rangaku movement would attempt to import Western technology without Western ideology (Goodman 228). Like China's "self-strengthening" movement of the late nineteenth century, the rangakashu's credo of "Western science and Eastern morals" failed by divorcing Western scientific advances from the humanistic concepts which had fostered them.

During the eighteenth century, the bakafu was increasingly undermined by kokugaku as well as its own failure to address economic problems and concerns about Western imperialism. By the 1830s, some rangakashu had succeeded in convincing many daimyo of he importance of acquiring Western knowledge (Sansom 247). The daimyo had long recognized in European technology the means to great wealth or power to regain independence for the bakafu. They soon became more concerned with external threats to Japanese sovereignty, however, and began sponsoring research on Western technology and defense (Goodman 147). Many daimyo took precautions suggested by the research of the rangakashu. Shimazu Shigehide, for example, placed artillery batteries on the Satsuma coast and constructed a small navy. (Shimazu also endorsed civilian research by testing a telegraph, a camera, and a gas lamp, and by building a smelting works and a glass factory) (Goodman 158). Private rangaku academies were founded by many daimyo, ostensibly for research in Dutch medicine, but incorporating a practical, military curriculum (Goodman 175; Keene 29).

As the rangakushu became better acquainted with the West through reading, many began to recognize the extent of Europe's power and advocated the voluntary opening of trade relations to prevent a humiliating, forced opening (Goodman 210). Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821) argued for the opening of Japanese markets and for Japanese imperialism as means of enhancing Japan's economy and stature. His suggestions were unheeded by the bakafu, however. When Russia made trade overtures i 1804, they were summarily rejected (Keene 106, 121).

By the mid-nineteenth century, the Dutch East Indies Company's fortunes had declined greatly. The chief excuse for maintaining the factory, claims Keene (6), was the lucrative smuggling that passed through Deshima. In the late eighteenth century, the Dutch could no longer afford naval protection for their merchant fleet, and the Deshima factory was thenceforth serviced by American ships (Jansen 545).

With the arrival of Commodore Perry, the Japanese soon learned that Holland was a nation on the periphery of Western technological advances. Japan was opened peacefully, and interest in rangaku rapidly declined (Jansen 553). Its effect on Japanese culture continues to be debated. While some scholars credit rangaku with initiating the Meiji Restoration through a spirit of enlightenment, others contend that its effect was negligible and that daimyo-sponsored rangkashu were actually obligated to strengthen feudal rule (Jansen 548).

Works Cited

• Boxer, Charles Ralph. Papers on Portuguese, Dutch, and Jesuit Influences in 16th- and 17th- Century Japan: Writings of Charles Ralph Boxer. Comp. Michael Moscato. Washington: University Publications of American, 1979.
• Goodman, Grant Kohn. Japan: the Dutch Experience. London: Athlone, 1986.
• Jansen, Marius B. "Rangaku and Westernization." Modern Asian Studies 18 (1984): 541-53.
• Keene, Donald. The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830. Rev. ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1969.
• Massarella, Derek. a World Elsewhere: Europe's Encounters with Japan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1990.
• Sansom, George Bailey, Sir. The Western World and Japan: a Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures. New York: Knopf, 1950.
  

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