

Growing Up in Iran: Tough Times for the Revolution's Children

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IRANIANS BORN IN THE EARLY years of the Islamic revolution are reaching their late 20s, but many in this generation will have to wait several more years before they can fully participate in the social and economic life of the country. Better educated than their predecessors, the revolution's children must wait years to get their first job and they lack the means to form a family. For young men aged twenty to twenty-nine, fewer than three in four have jobs, only two in five are married, and nearly three-quarters still live with their parents. Young women are in an even worse situation: nearly half are unemployed, three in five are married, and close to half live with their parents. These conditions have led to the social exclusion of youth,¹ robbing them of hope in their future and that of their country.

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
Two reasons are usually offered for why youth transitions to adulthood are particularly difficult for this generation of Iranians. The first reason is the youth bulge. The population of youth, defined here as the age group between 15 and 29 years old, is the largest in Iran's history at 25 million people, and it has been growing at more than 5 percent per year, twice the growth rate of the total population. Individuals belonging to this group generally do not fare as well in the labor market as adults,² They find it harder to find work and their earnings tend to be lower. The difficulties that this generation of Iranians face in transition to adulthood are no doubt related to the baby boom of the early years of the revolution, which has caused the youth bulge today. But I would argue that while the youth bulge has exacerbated the pains associated with transition to adulthood in Iran, it is by no means its root cause.

The second most popular explanation is the poor performance of the Iranian economy. It is true in the sense that the economy has not operated near its potential,

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but at least in the last decade (1996–2006), economic growth has been robust due to the inflow of oil revenues (about 5.5% per year), creating nearly 10 million jobs. Evidently, this has not been good enough to absorb the rapidly rising cohort of baby boomers: having reduced the unemployment rate for those older than 30 to only 4.8 percent (see Figure 1) and having raised average incomes by about 50 percent, it has left one-in-four youth unemployed and more than half lacking the means to set up a family of their own.



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Figure 1. Unemployment rate by age, 2006 (Source: Statistical Center of Iran, National Census of Population, 2006)

In this paper, I examine obstacles to youth transitions in Iran, from school to work and also to marriage and independent living, with the aim of explaining the reasons why economic growth has so far failed to ease youth transitions to adulthood. In section one I explain Iran’s particular demographic situation which results in the difficulties youth face in employment and marriage. In section two, I explain the unemployment problem of educated youth in terms of mismatched skills. I describe the features of the education system that produces high school and university graduates who lack the skills necessary for jobs in today’s labor market, as well as the institutions of the labor market that set the incentives for skill formation that guide investments in education. In section three, I discuss the marriage market and show how demography and economic structures work together to delay marriage in Iran. In section four, I

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conclude with a discussion of policy options that might help future youth to enter the labor market better prepared and more capable of building careers as they transition from school to work.

THE YOUTH BULGE

Iran has experienced one of the most pronounced demographic shifts in the world. Rising fertility around the time of the revolution was rather quickly followed by a sharp decline after 1985, resulting in one of the biggest youth bulges in the world 25 years later.³

In 1986, Iran had a classic high fertility age distribution with the youngest age group (0–4) as the largest group (18.3 percent of the population). By 1996, the share of the youngest age group had fallen dramatically to 10.3 percent and fell even lower in 2006 to 7.7 percent. At the same time, the share of youth (15–29) increased from 26.4 percent in 1986 to 35.4 percent in 2006. Consider that in 2005, in Egypt and Turkey, two countries in the Middle East region with similar size populations, these youth ratios were 29 and 27 percent, respectively.⁴

EDUCATION, SKILL FORMATION, AND EMPLOYMENT

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The irony of youth unemployment in Iran, as in most Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, is that it affects educated youth more severely than the less educated.

Iranian youth with less than a secondary school education have lower unemployment rates and appear to have benefited more from the economic growth of the last few years (see Table 1). In contrast, the unemployment rate for youth with secondary education has stayed around 20 percent, and for women with post-

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secondary education it has actually increased, from 36.1 to 50.4 percent. Thanks to the oil boom, demand for labor has expanded in recent years, but not at a sufficient rate to absorb the rapid rate at which youth with high school and college degrees are entering the labor market. The problem is in part with the low average quality of education in Iran and a mismatch between what students learn in schools and what employers need. In either case, the promise of more education as the recipe for success no longer seems to be true for this generation. Having worked hard to reach higher levels of schooling, a large majority has to wait a long time for their first job and is naturally very disappointed.

Education level	2000		2004	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Illiterate	15.9	4.9	6.6	1.6
Primary	20.9	6.8	7.8	3.5
Lower sec	25.7	25.0	11.7	14.9
Some upper sec	32.5	45.0	18.9	25.7
Upper secondary	37.0	60.7	20.3	38.8
Post secondary	27.9	36.7	25.1	51.4
Total	27.8	33.1	15.8	32.6

Table 1: Unemployment Rates by Gender and Education (percent)⁵

Expansion of education in Iran has been impressive, reaching further than ever into rural and low-income areas. Enrollment rates (see Table 2) have increased and are now comparable to neighboring countries, such as Turkey.⁶ Average years of schooling for youth aged 20 to 29 is now about 10 years, with a slight edge for women. Unfortunately, the expansion in quantity has not been matched by improvements in quality. In some respects, quality may have decreased. The largest cohort in Iran’s history started school during the war years and the deep economic recession of the 1980s, attending schools that were poorly staffed and operated in two or three shifts.

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	1991	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Preprimary	11.96	13.27	15.67	18.77	23.05	30.83	36.67	45.55
Preprimary, female	11.65	13.57	16.11	19.39	24.19	32.64	38.78	48.07
Preprimary, male	12.25	12.99	15.26	18.17	21.96	29.12	34.66	43.14
Primary	109.36	95.79	93.63	93.20	92.35	92.11	103.01	110.72
Primary, female	103.61	93.19	91.39	91.11	90.58	90.61	107.99	122.11
Primary, male	114.83	98.25	95.76	95.18	94.02	93.54	98.28	99.91
Secondary	57.50	77.28	78.05	77.36	77.20	78.51	81.86	80.64
Secondary, female	49.03	74.40	75.59	75.08	75.23	76.08	79.11	78.07
Secondary, male	65.47	80.03	80.38	79.53	79.07	80.83	84.47	83.09
Tertiary	10.22	18.84	19.03	20.18	19.26	20.32	22.50	23.94
Tertiary, female	6.53	16.73	17.63	19.58	19.35	21.11	23.65	24.97
Tertiary, male	13.68	20.86	20.37	20.75	19.18	19.56	21.40	22.96

Table 2: Enrollment rates by gender and level of education, 1991-2005.⁷ (Note: Gross enrollments rates)

But problems with quality in Iran’s schools go well beyond lack of resources due to an unusually large number of students. Deeper organizational and systemic problems

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have given rise to what has been described in the case of Middle Eastern countries as the problem of mismatch of skills.⁸ At the heart of the organizational problem is the high level of centralization of the education system, both in terms of administration and purpose. In Iran, more than 90 percent of students attend public schools, which are neither accountable to parents nor sensitive to employer needs. A recent World Bank report on education singles out lack of accountability as the main reason for the low quality of education in MENA.⁹

The education system in Iran, more than other countries in the Middle East, places undue emphasis on testing and on university degrees as the purpose of education. In Iran, parents dream of their children entering university rather than acquiring the skills that will make them productive workers and good citizens of their community. At the helm of all exams is the infamous university entrance examination (the *concour*), which is administered by the government and, to increase its objectivity and keep costs low, consists of multiple-choice questions that are graded by computers. Were it not for the fact that this one test determines whether or not a young person can enter university, which is to say determine his or her future, this would not be a huge problem. If, as in the United States, performance in high school and extra-curricular activities counted for university admission, reliance on one multiple choice test to evaluate specific skills would not distort student incentives to learn a variety of skills. As things are now, some very valuable skills, such as writing and keyboard typing, are not covered at all, and important areas of knowledge, such as history and geography, are only covered in the entrance tests for the humanities, which attracts a minority of high school graduates. Any subject that is not on the big test is less emphasized in schools and ignored by diligent parents who are solely focused on getting their kids through to a university. Correcting student writing samples is one of the most useful things teachers do worldwide, because it fosters student creativity, but it is also the hardest thing to do. So, if it is not going to matter for entering university, parents and students will not ask for writing skills to be taught in schools. Multiple choice tests may work well for many subjects but they are ill suited for testing creative subjects, such as writing. Under the current system, which rewards acquisition of degrees over learning skills, the Iranian public would seem unwilling to sacrifice the objectivity of the machine graded tests in order to foster creativity.

The government and the parents are well aware of the shortcomings of the *concour*, so the idea of getting rid of the examination has been seriously discussed in the Parliament.¹⁰ Eliminating the *concour*, as the thrust of the current parliamentary discussion seems to suggest, will do little to widen the set of skills taught at schools because it will not by itself redirect student attention toward the acquisition of the type of skills that are harder to test. For this to happen, the purpose of education, which is to get

a secure (preferably government) job, has to change. The rise of formal schooling in Iran is closely related to the early twentieth century need to educate a class of modern civil servants. Even today, despite their low pay, public sector jobs are coveted because of their security.

But public sector jobs are becoming scarce, and the education system has to change to fit the needs of the rising private sector. In the last two decades, the private sector has overtaken the public sector in terms of the number of wage and salary jobs. In the 1980s, roughly 60 percent of all wage and salary workers were employed by the government; this share has declined to 40 percent.¹¹ The private sector primarily hires workers with less than secondary education, but its share of educated workers is increasing as it expands into areas that are in greater need for trained workers. As the employer that offers greater job security, the public sector still has more influence on the incentives that determine what students learn compared to the private sector. I believe this is the main reason for the mismatch of skills that afflicts those with secondary education and above. The lure of the public sector translates into undue emphasis on diplomas, which leads to the singular aim in K through 12 education to score highly on tests, especially in the university entrance examinations. For the large majority of Iranian students, this means rote memorization of facts and concepts instead of learning critical thinking and problem solving skills.

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As private employers offer more and better jobs to those with secondary and tertiary education, the pressure on the education system to teach skills that fit their needs will increase. These pressures will come from parents who do not wish to spend money on remedial education and summer courses to prepare their children for private sector jobs. But first, there has to be clear signals from the private sector regarding the types of skills they reward. At present, Iran's labor markets are not well organized for such signals to reach their intended audience effectively. For example, Iran's labor laws restrict employer discretion in setting pay and in decisions regarding layoffs.¹² Such discretion is critical for efficient operation of private businesses and for signaling of returns to skills. Greater signaling of the rewards to skills that private employers find productive will help redirect the education system toward teaching a wider set of skills. Since a wide variety of productive skills cannot be recorded on a piece of paper, schools will have to reduce their emphasis on tests and diplomas. They will have to find ways to encourage students to learn such skills as creative writing and teamwork, and to foster ambition and a positive attitude toward work.

A major obstacle in reducing restrictions on private sector employment is popular distrust of capitalism, which flourished after the revolution and from time to time receives a boost from populist politics. The notion that the government, empowered by oil revenues, can solve the youth employment problem runs deep and wide in the Iranian

society. A major reason for Ahmadinejad's election was his promise to "bring the oil money to people's dinner tables." What has not been sufficiently realized is that oil money can only bring imported goods to the dinner table, which may well result in the loss of the jobs of the person at the head of the table. In the 1990s, under the administrations of Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami, the trend of increasing job protection reversed. For example, in 2003, the leftist Khatami administration amended the Labor Law of 1990

to exclude firms with fewer than five workers. The Law places the burden of proof on the employer when workers are laid off. Workers could complain to a local Labor Council, composed

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of three members representing employers, workers, and the Ministry of Labor. If the Council ruled against unfair dismissal, the employer had to pay fines and re-instate the worker. The law not only raised the cost of employing workers with unproven skills and work habits, it effectively prevented private employers from providing signals of rewards for these skills to students and their parents. Successive governments have tried to walk a fine line between appearing sensitive to revolutionary demands for workers' rights and the needs of the labor markets to function effectively.

There are initiatives to extend the exemption to firms with fewer than 10 workers. In 2002, these firms employed about one-half of Iran's wage and salary workers.¹³ Giving smaller firms more freedom to set their compensation and personnel policies is particularly effective when viewed from the youth perspective because small firms are the most likely to hire young, first-time job seekers. Exemption from the Labor Law also enables the smaller informal firms to become formal, which would help youth treat jobs in these firms more seriously, as places to gain work experience and display skills that formal education does not provide. The regulations imposed by the Labor Law, in addition to the ability to avoid taxes, have a lot to do why small firms decide to stay informal. Exempting smaller firms from the more inhibiting facets of the Labor Law, such as the freedom to reward, hire, and fire, tilts the balance away from older, established workers in favor of youth.

Iranian labor markets are highly segmented, composed of a highly protected formal sector (both public and private) and a large informal sector, where most youth "hang around" while waiting for their turn for the protected permanent job. The classic tension between the labor market "insiders"—who are above age 30—and the "outsiders"—the youth—is at play on a daily basis. Unfortunately, for the fast growing youth population, the age groups ahead of them are also growing at a fast rate: the population of 50-year-olds is growing at about 6 percent per year—at about the same rate as the 20-year-olds—but job protection for older workers prevents the young from competing for jobs even if they are better qualified.

MARRIAGE AND FAMILY FORMATION

Marriage in Iran is closely bound with tradition. Parents play a key role in arranging and financing the marriage ceremony as well as setting up the new household. Gender roles are asymmetric. As breadwinners, the most important attribute of young men in marriage is their prospects for employment and income. For the majority of youth from modest backgrounds, a diploma from a reputable institution of higher education or a job in the formal sector are the most reliable ways to signal a man's ability as provider. Thus, while the institution of marriage has remained fairly traditional, matchmaking has come to depend on the outcomes of the relatively modern institutions of education and employment. As a forward-looking contract, marriage has to deal with uncertainty in several dimensions. To the extent that education credentials or early jobs can reduce or resolve the economic uncertainty about the future of a couple, youth transitions to family formation are smoother. When these institutions themselves add to that uncertainty, as they do now in Iran, getting married becomes more difficult and marriage is involuntarily delayed.

The average age at which Iranians first get married has been on the rise as education has increased and fertility has declined, but there is reason to believe that not all of the increase is for the better. This question arises in the case of Iran especially because of the strict codes of contact between the sexes, enforced by law in public spaces. Delay in marriage may therefore not be entirely voluntary. Table 3 shows the percentage of never-married people by age groups. The proportion of never-married men aged 25 to 29 increased from 21 percent in 1986 to 28 percent in 1996 and 36 percent in 2006. For women, these numbers are 14 percent, 16 percent, and 24 percent, respectively. These rates are lower in East Asian countries where fertility is lower, education is higher, and the social norms for relations between the sexes are more relaxed.¹⁴ The involuntary nature of the rise in age at marriage can also be gauged from the increasing proportion of men and women in their 20s who live with their parents. The fact that in 2005, 75 percent of men in their 20s lived with their parents (up from 50 percent in 1984) suggests that, besides rising education and falling fertility, economic factors (mainly unemployment) also mattered.¹⁵

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Age	1986		1996		2006	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
10-14	99.60	98.31	99.58	97.11	97.47	96.66
15-19	95.04	71.91	96.94	82.58	96.98	82.31
20-24	63.32	32.95	73.43	41.26	78.35	49.22
25-29	21.29	13.69	27.94	15.97	36.45	23.83
30-34	7.38	7.51	7.89	7.24	12.23	11.51
35-39	3.76	5.05	3.03	3.94	4.99	6.08
40-44	2.82	4.15	1.62	2.54	2.60	3.54

Table 3. The proportion of never married women by age, 1986-2006¹⁶

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Women baby boomers (born between 1979 and 1984) face an additional obstacle in marriage—a shortage of men. This is because women baby boomers reached marriage age (20 to 24 years) expecting to marry men a few years older from smaller cohorts. For example, in 2006, the ratio of men between 25 and 29 to women between 20 and 24 was 0.82 (3.7 million men compared to 4.5 million women). There is no evidence that the resulting “marriage squeeze” has had any appreciable effect on a principal variable that could restore equilibrium to the marriage market—the age difference between men and women at the time of marriage.¹⁷ We do observe, however, some change in the willingness of women to marry men with less education. In 2005, nearly half of men with a primary education were married to women with more education, up from about 20 percent in 1990, and 10 percent of men with a high school education were married to more educated women, up from about 3 percent.¹⁸

The high cost of marriage is another obstacle to family formation, and, paradoxically, there is no evidence that women’s weaker bargaining position has lowered the groom’s obligation at the time of marriage. Traditionally, the bride’s family provides the new household with the basic home furnishings (the dowry), while the groom’s family takes up the wedding costs. In 2003, average dowry expenditures amounted to about 12 percent of the family’s annual expenditures.¹⁹ There are no data on wedding costs, but anecdotal evidence suggests that they can easily run up to \$10,000 for the average middle class family, which is about a year’s income. In addition to bearing the cost of the wedding, the groom often promises a certain sum, known as *mahr*, to be paid to the bride at a time of her choosing, usually if the husband initiates divorce. All these costs add up to a significant sum for the average family and contribute to delays in marriage.

Even if social norms regarding the age difference and marriage costs were more flexible so as to allow more youth to marry when they wish, housing costs would still pose a serious problem for family formation. Of the thresholds that define adulthood, none is a more definitive marker than setting up one’s own independent household. In recent years, the inflation in the cost of housing fueled by the oil boom has put the dream of buying or renting a place beyond the reach of most young couples.

IMPLICATIONS FOR YOUTH POLICY

The pains of coming of age in Islamic Iran have not gone unnoticed by the government, but youth policy has not addressed the underlying causes of youth exclusion. The social and economic cost of youth exclusion in lost output due to unemployment, low productivity due to poor skill formation, and lost hopes and despair for not being able to marry and form a family are huge. Some alienated youth have taken to drugs

and other forms of risky behavior, while others have veered toward radical politics. The policy response of the government has been wide ranging, from offering services through its Youth Organization, to subsidies for employment and marriage. There is no evaluation of the impact of these policies, but they generally tackle the symptoms rather than the causes of youth problems.

The Iranian Youth Organization focuses its activities mainly on helping youth better manage their leisure time. It has a budget of about \$30 million per year, which amounts to only about \$1.10 per young person per year. The largest government programs have been aimed at employment. The Khatami government launched an “emergency employment program” in 2003, which disbursed about \$1.2 billion both for self-employment and in the form of a wage subsidy to employers who hired young unemployed individuals. The average size of the credit was about 30,000 rials (about \$3,600). There has been no evaluation of this program, so we do not know how many new jobs were created because of it.

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In 2006, Ahmadinejad’s government introduced a credit program with a much wider scope, this time using the resources of the publicly owned banks to lend to what are called “quick return” projects which create jobs for youth. The size of the average loan is reported at 600,000 rials (about \$65,000), which is quite substantial. According to the Economic Minister, by March 2007 more than 7 trillion rials (about \$7.5 billion) had been disbursed. A controversy has raged in the Iranian press since the program’s inception involving the governor of the Central Bank and the Economy Minister, both of whom questioned the program’s effectiveness and its impact on inflation and had to resign. There are reports of loans that have been diverted to real estate and slow progress of others’ loans. Again, so far there has been no evaluation of this program, though there is still time to fully evaluate it. President Ahmadinejad has shown a great deal of interest in helping youth get married. Even as Mayor of Tehran, he helped defray the cost of weddings by hosting mass weddings. As president, he set up the Mehr Reza Fund, which provides loans of about \$2,000 to newly married couples (payable in three years with a 4 percent annual “service charge”).

These programs are well intentioned but are unlikely to address the underlying causes of youth exclusion in Iran. Youth policy should not be limited to subsidies and government handouts. Governments have effective ways of helping youth transition by reforming education and removing obstacles for youth employment. As I have argued above, Iran’s over-regulated labor markets constrain employers from taking advantage of rising demand to create jobs for youth. An important reason why firms do not employ more youth is because youth lack the skills they need. Moreover, the jobs for young workers who do have the skills are restricted to those newly created because existing jobs are occupied by older workers and are not open to competition by young workers.

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Until labor markets become more competitive, new jobs will remain scarce and young workers will have to wait years for their first job. These problems will no doubt ease with the passing of the youth bulge, which should happen in about ten years, but the false demand for diplomas will continue to drive education and the mismatch of skills will persist as long as employers do not have a credible way to influence what students learn in school and at home.

Enabling private employers to have a credible influence on what students learn is politically very difficult, especially in a post-revolutionary society such as Iran. But there are a few favorable elements to build on. First, Iran has a relatively extensive system of social protection, though it is mostly geared toward poverty reduction rather than social insurance.²⁰ An important precondition for labor market reform is for workers to be willing to accept the risks inherent in private employment. This, in turn, requires a system of social protection that replaces job protection by income protection. Second, labor market reforms can find support from youth and their parents, who are paying dearly for the price of security through employment protection. The more Iranians realize that the flexibility of employment is not only good for increasing work effort, but that it is also good for skill formation, the more willing they will be to redirect their system of social protection away from the regulation of employment toward income protection.

As noted earlier, there are signs that this reform is not only possible but also likely. Successive Islamic governments have shown more flexibility than one would expect from revolutionary leaders in promoting private enterprise. Iran is at present in an uneasy balance between further embracing markets and competition, and moving toward greater reliance on the government to solve the country's problems. Iran's politics are similarly divided between the pragmatists led by former President Rafsanjani on the one side (left on politics, right on economics) and the populist camp led by current President Ahmadinejad (right on politics, left on economics), with many other factions in between. If undisturbed by hostile external action, the next presidential election in June 2009 will be extremely interesting to watch. A key question that this election could answer is whether voters, and young Iranians in particular, prefer a more open economy and polity to the current redistributive society. The first is roughly the direction they were moving under Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami, while the second would guarantee the continuation of the rhetoric and policies of the last three years. 

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NOTES

1. I use the term social exclusion to refer to the difficulties of transition to work and family formation. Large sections of Iranian youth in addition feel excluded from social and political participation.
2. Richard A. Easterlin, *Population, Labor Force and Long Swings in Economic Growth: The American*

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Experience (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1968).

3. For Iran's fertility decline, see Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, Amir Mehryar, Gavin Jones, and Peter McDonald, "Revolution, war and modernization: Population policy and fertility change in Iran," *Journal of Population Research* 19, no. 1 (May 2002): 25–46.

4. United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Population Division, "World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision," <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/wpp2006.htm>

5. Statistical Center of Iran, *Household Employment and Unemployment Surveys*, 2000 and 2004.

6. Iran's female enrollment rates for primary and secondary schools are much higher than Turkey's: in 2004, enrollment rates in primary (net) were 95 and 89 percent, and in secondary (only gross rates are reported), 79 and 67 percent.

7. World Bank, "World Development Indicators Database," (Washington DC: World Bank, 2007).

8. Djavad Salehi-Isfahani and Navtej Dhillon, "Stalled transitions to adulthood in the Middle East: A framework for policy reform" (Washington, DC: Wolfensohn Center for Development, Brookings Institution, 2008).

9. World Bank, *The Road Not Traveled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007).

10. See my commentary on the proposed reform of the concour, "On the Right Track? Iran Edges toward Education Reform," Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1211_education_salehi_isfahani.aspx.

11. Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, "Human resources in Iran: potentials and challenges," *Iranian Studies* 38, no.1 (March 2005): 117–147. Reprinted in eds. Homa Katouzian and Hossein Shahidi, *Iran in the 21st Century* (London: Routledge, 2007).

12. Ibid.

13. Statistical Center of Iran, *Census of Establishments*, 2002.

14. Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon, "A framework of analysis of youth policy in the Middle East."

15. Djavad Salehi-Isfahani and Daniel Egel, "Youth Exclusion in Iran: The State of Education, Employment and Family Formation," working paper (Washington, DC: Wolfensohn Center for Development, The Brookings Institution, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/09_youth_exclusion_salehi_isfahani.aspx?rssid=salehiisfahanid.

16. Statistical Center of Iran, *National Census of Population*, 1986, 1996, 2006.

17. Salehi-Isfahani and Egel.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, "Poverty, Inequality, and Populist Politics in Iran," *Journal of Economic Inequality*, forthcoming. <http://www.springerlink.com/content/67k71t441vk54ml3>

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